The Question Concerning Technology in Compliance

In this symposium Essay, I apply insights from philosophy and psychology to argue that modes of achieving compliance that focus on technology undermine, and are undermined by, modes of achieving compliance that focus on culture. Insisting on both may mean succeeding at neither. How an organization resolves this apparent contradiction in program design, like the broader question of optimal corporate governance arrangements, is highly idiosyncratic. Firms should therefore be accorded maximum freedom in designing their compliance programs, rather than being forced by enforcement authorities into a set of de facto mandatory compliance structures

The Question Concerning Technology in Compliance

In this symposium Essay, I apply insights from philosophy and psychology to argue that modes of achieving compliance that focus on technology undermine, and are undermined by, modes of achieving compliance that focus on culture. Insisting on both may mean succeeding at neither. How an organization resolves this apparent contradiction in program design, like the broader question of optimal corporate governance arrangements, is highly idiosyncratic. Firms should therefore be accorded maximum freedom in designing their compliance programs, rather than being forced by enforcement authorities into a set of de facto mandatory compliance structures

The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors\u27 & Officers\u27 Liability Insurer

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors\u27 and officers\u27 liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the bonding provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance contract nor manage litigation defense costs once claims arise. Our findings raise significant questions about the value of D&O insurance for shareholders as well as the deterrent effect of corporate and securities liability. After exploring various explanations for these findings, we conclude that the absence of monitoring is due, at least in part, to the agency problem in the corporate context. Our analysis thus suggests that the existing form of corporate D&O insurance both results from and contributes to the relatively weak constraints on corporate managers. Corporate managers buy D&O coverage for self-serving reasons, and the coverage itself because it does not control moral hazard, reduces the extent to which shareholder litigation aligns managers\u27and shareholders\u27 incentives

The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors\u27 & Officers\u27 Liability Insurer

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors\u27 and officers\u27 liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the bonding provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance contract nor manage litigation defense costs once claims arise. Our findings raise significant questions about the value of D&O insurance for shareholders as well as the deterrent effect of corporate and securities liability. After exploring various explanations for these findings, we conclude that the absence of monitoring is due, at least in part, to the agency problem in the corporate context. Our analysis thus suggests that the existing form of corporate D&O insurance both results from and contributes to the relatively weak constraints on corporate managers. Corporate managers buy D&O coverage for self-serving reasons, and the coverage itself because it does not control moral hazard, reduces the extent to which shareholder litigation aligns managers\u27and shareholders\u27 incentives

The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation

The recent finding that corporate litigation involving Delaware companies very often takes place outside of Delaware has disturbed the long-settled understanding of how merger litigation works. With many, even most, cases being filed and ultimately resolved outside of Delaware, commentators warn that the trend is a threat to shareholders, to Delaware, and to the integrity of corporate law generally. Although the out-of-Delaware trend suggests that litigants are seeking to use the procedural rules of other jurisdictions to their advantage, we argue that the result need not threaten the interests of any of the stakeholders in deal litigation. We reframe the process of resolving merger litigation as a market for preclusion, in which plaintiffs seek to sell and defendants seek to buy an important element of transactional certainty. Moreover, this market has the potential to efficiently process and price shareholder complaints while also providing benefits to Delaware and to corporate law more generally. We are not blind to reality, however, and also address how a well-functioning market for preclusion can be distorted by the opportunistic conduct of plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys alike. Greater judicial oversight is necessary to preserve the benefits of this market while preventing the distortions brought on through opportunistic conduct. In order to make this a reality, however, judges in different courts must have a means of communicating and coordinating across state lines. We therefore offer a theory of horizontal comity in which judges build trust and cooperation through communication across jurisdictional boundaries. We use this theory to suggest a set of concrete policy proposals designed to provide for a more efficient market for preclusion

Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A How-To Guide

Stockholder litigation remains in crisis, with over seventy percent of major mergers and acquisitions subject to litigation. A contributing factor is the breakdown of the adversary process at settlement, when former opponents join hands in favor of a compromise that too often expends corporate resources for no real recovery to the plaintiff class. One obvious corrective is the shareholder’s objection to settlement, which restores adversarial character to the settlement process. Shareholders, however, face substantial difficulties in making such objections. In this article, the authors detail the problem and share their experiences in addressing these obstacles, providing a how-to manual for future shareholder objections to class action settlements in merger litigation

Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine

Regulation by litigation has driven U.S. merger regulation to crisis. The reliance on private lawsuits to police disclosures and potential conflicts of interest in mergers, takeovers, and other control transactions has resulted in the filing of claims after every major transaction. However, it has failed to achieve meaningful benefits for shareholders and has instead deprived them of potentially valuable rights. Regulation by litigation has devolved into attorney rent-seeking, and the raft of substantive and procedural reforms aimed at resolving the crisis has failed. There is an alternative to regulation by litigation. Drawing upon the code and panel-based models of merger regulation in the United Kingdom and Ireland, this Article explores whether a regulatory model might be better at protecting shareholder interests in merger transactions. A regulatory alternative holds a number of significant advantages, including greater speed, responsiveness, certainty, and lower administrative costs. In light of these potential advantages, it is remarkable that no U.S. state has experimented with a code and panel-based model of merger regulation. We explain the persistent difference between the U.S. and Anglo-Irish models by reference to interest group politics and, in particular, the power of the bar to influence corporate law reforms in the United States

Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence

This Article develops a theory of rhetoric in corporate law jurisprudence. It begins by examining a recent innovation in Delaware case law: the emerging principle of good faith. Good faith is an old notion in law generally, but it offers to bring significant change to corporate law, including realignment of the business judgment rule and a shift in the traditional balance between the authority of boards and the accountability of boards to courts. This Article argues, however, that good faith functions as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates as a speech act, a performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis. To explain the sudden appearance of good faith, this Article articulates a model of corporate law rhetoric. Courts invent rhetorical devices to loosen corporate law doctrine and increase judicial review of board decisionmaking in response to scandals and other extralegal pressures operating upon the judiciary. These pressures stem largely from the twin threats of corporate migration and federal preemption, both of which imperil the primacy of the Delaware judiciary as a corporate lawmaker. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary employs rhetorical devices to reduce these pressures, typically with the effect of increasing board accountability, only to return, once the pressure recedes, to a position of board deference. After finding several examples of this pattern in corporate law history, this Article argues, ultimately, that regular movement back and forth along the authority/accountability spectrum is an essential feature of corporate law jurisprudence and that understanding the rhetorical devices that permit this movement is necessary to complete any account of what corporate law is and how it works